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October 6, 2026

By: David A. Bowen

On September 15, 2026, the federal banking agencies published two proposals that would change how community banks assess risks associated with vendors, technology providers, and other outside firms. The Federal Reserve System (“Board”), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) jointly published Proposed Third-Party Risk Management Guidance (“All-Bank Guidance”). The same day, the Board published in the Federal Register a Proposed Third-Party Risk Management Guide for Traditional Community Banking Organizations (“Community Bank Guidance”). The Board presents its Community Bank Guidance as a companion to the All-Bank Guidance that shows smaller institutions how to apply the broader principles in practice. Four days earlier, the Board, the FDIC, and the OCC also issued a Joint Statement on Community Banks’ Engagement with Core Service Providers (“Joint Statement”). Taken together, these materials signal a shift from process-driven, uniform expectations to a risk-based approach that calibrates oversight to each relationship.

Who Is Covered

The All-Bank Guidance applies to all banking organizations supervised by a Federal banking agency. The Community Bank Guidance is narrower. It applies to traditional community banking organizations, which the Board defines as banking organizations with less than $30 billion in assets that focus on serving their local communities. The guidance, however, is not intended for community banking organizations with more complex business models or third-party relationship profiles, such as complex bank-fintech partnerships in which the fintech, rather than the bank, markets, distributes, or provides access to the products. The Board has asked for comment on the $30 billion threshold and on how to clarify which institutions qualify, so this boundary may shift before the Community Bank Guidance is finalized.

The Joint Statement addresses community banking organizations, or CBOs, in their dealings with core providers. A core provider is a third party that supplies the critical systems and infrastructure behind essential bank functions, including transaction processing, account management, payments processing, compliance and reporting, and online banking.

What the Proposals Would Replace

The agencies state that they plan to rescind and replace existing third-party risk management guidance. The guidance under reconsideration is the 2023 Interagency Guidance on Third-Party Relationships: Risk Management. Any final guidance would also replace three supplemental resources: OCC Bulletin 2002-16 on foreign-based third-party service providers; the 2024 Joint Statement on Banks’ Arrangements with Third Parties to Deliver Bank Deposit Products; and the 2024 Interagency Guidance on Third-Party Risk Management: A Guide for Community Banks. The agencies also ask commenters whether any additional guidance documents or interpretive letters should be rescinded.

From Process-Driven to Risk-Tailored Expectations

The All-Bank Guidance focuses on aligning oversight with the severity and likelihood of potential harm, rather than the activity’s label. The agencies explain that the 2023 Guidance was often read too broadly, focused too heavily on whether an activity was critical rather than on the risk actually presented, and encouraged check-the-box processes that spread attention evenly instead of directing it to the highest-risk relationships. The proposal frames sound practice around four components: (1) identifying and assessing risk; (2) overseeing risk based on its significance; (3) making informed decisions about residual risk and risk acceptance; and (4) establishing appropriate governance practices.

The practical effects of the All-Bank Guidance may be meaningful for some banks. For example, a bank may elect to maintain a streamlined vendor inventory and exclude limited-risk relationships, such as clerical, professional, or office support services. Risk tiering should consider both the potential harm and the likelihood of that harm occurring, with relationships such as core processing likely treated as higher risk. Due diligence should scale with risk, allowing banks to use less extensive or publicly available information for lower-risk relationships. The proposal also states that no prescribed contractual terms are generally expected, even for higher-risk relationships, and that the presence or absence of a particular term in the provider contract alone would not support an adverse examination finding. Monitoring may be periodic or continuous based on risk. More broadly, the agencies recognize that banks are expected to manage, rather than eliminate, third-party risk.

What the Community Bank Guidance Adds

The Community Bank Guidance applies the principles set forth in the All-Bank Guidance to the operational realities of smaller institutions. It identifies four key areas of risk that will generally warrant the greatest attention: (1) operational resilience, which focuses on the impact a service provider disruption could have on the bank; (2) system and information security; (3) compliance with applicable laws and regulations, which focuses on how a third party impacts a bank’s ability to comply with applicable laws and regulations; and (4) financial resilience, which considers how a provider’s financial condition could affect the bank.

The guidance then examines eight categories of third-party providers commonly used by community banks: (1) core service providers; (2) information technology infrastructure providers; (3) cybersecurity providers; (4) payment processing and digital banking providers; (5) loan management system providers; (6) card issuing and processing providers; (7) Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money laundering financial crime platform providers; and (8) fraud prevention and detection providers. For each provider category, the guidance explains how the four key risk areas should be evaluated. In several instances, the guidance also addresses transition planning, including the process of converting from one core platform to another.

The Core Service Provider Joint Statement

The Joint Statement addresses a longstanding challenge for community banks. A small number of large firms dominate the core service provider market, reducing banks’ negotiating leverage and making it harder to conduct due diligence, negotiate appropriate contractual terms, and monitor performance. In deciding how closely to supervise a core provider directly, including whether to include it in a service provider examination program, the agencies will evaluate factors involving transparency, contract terms, and technology.

The Joint Statement highlights several practices that can increase concentration and exit risks for community banks, including unclear pricing and billing, lengthy periods for imposing retroactive charges, and excessive restrictions on integrations with other providers. It also raises concerns about unsupported or undefined deconversion fees, particularly when a bank must leave a platform because the provider breached the contract or delivered inadequate service.

Finally, the agencies indicate that certain core providers may qualify as institution-affiliated parties under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and could therefore face liability for a bank’s violations. Banks nevertheless remain ultimately responsible for operating in a safe and sound manner.

Looking Ahead

The proposals may change before they are finalized. The All-Bank Guidance and the Community Bank Guidance do not establish enforceable standards, and a failure to follow them will not, standing alone, result in supervisory action or criticism. The agencies may still act in response to violations of law or unsafe or unsound practices. Whether examiners will nevertheless apply the guidance as a de facto standard in examinations remains uncertain.

Comments on the All-Bank Guidance and Community Bank Guidance are due by November 16, 2026. The agencies may revise the proposals in response to stakeholder feedback before issuing final guidance. Banks should use the interim period to evaluate whether their third-party risk management programs support risk-based tailoring and proportionate oversight.

Krieg DeVault’s Financial Institutions attorneys will continue monitoring the proposed guidance and are able to provide counsel to financial institutions on the impact of the final guidance to their operations.


Disclaimer: The contents of this article should not be construed as legal advice or a legal opinion on any specific facts or circumstances. The contents are intended for general informational purposes only, and you are urged to consult with counsel concerning your situation and specific legal questions you may have.

October 6, 2026

By: David A. Bowen

On September 15, 2026, the federal banking agencies published two proposals that would change how community banks assess risks associated with vendors, technology providers, and other outside firms. The Federal Reserve System (“Board”), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) jointly published Proposed Third-Party Risk Management Guidance (“All-Bank Guidance”). The same day, the Board published in the Federal Register a Proposed Third-Party Risk Management Guide for Traditional Community Banking Organizations (“Community Bank Guidance”). The Board presents its Community Bank Guidance as a companion to the All-Bank Guidance that shows smaller institutions how to apply the broader principles in practice. Four days earlier, the Board, the FDIC, and the OCC also issued a Joint Statement on Community Banks’ Engagement with Core Service Providers (“Joint Statement”). Taken together, these materials signal a shift from process-driven, uniform expectations to a risk-based approach that calibrates oversight to each relationship.

Who Is Covered

The All-Bank Guidance applies to all banking organizations supervised by a Federal banking agency. The Community Bank Guidance is narrower. It applies to traditional community banking organizations, which the Board defines as banking organizations with less than $30 billion in assets that focus on serving their local communities. The guidance, however, is not intended for community banking organizations with more complex business models or third-party relationship profiles, such as complex bank-fintech partnerships in which the fintech, rather than the bank, markets, distributes, or provides access to the products. The Board has asked for comment on the $30 billion threshold and on how to clarify which institutions qualify, so this boundary may shift before the Community Bank Guidance is finalized.

The Joint Statement addresses community banking organizations, or CBOs, in their dealings with core providers. A core provider is a third party that supplies the critical systems and infrastructure behind essential bank functions, including transaction processing, account management, payments processing, compliance and reporting, and online banking.

What the Proposals Would Replace

The agencies state that they plan to rescind and replace existing third-party risk management guidance. The guidance under reconsideration is the 2023 Interagency Guidance on Third-Party Relationships: Risk Management. Any final guidance would also replace three supplemental resources: OCC Bulletin 2002-16 on foreign-based third-party service providers; the 2024 Joint Statement on Banks’ Arrangements with Third Parties to Deliver Bank Deposit Products; and the 2024 Interagency Guidance on Third-Party Risk Management: A Guide for Community Banks. The agencies also ask commenters whether any additional guidance documents or interpretive letters should be rescinded.

From Process-Driven to Risk-Tailored Expectations

The All-Bank Guidance focuses on aligning oversight with the severity and likelihood of potential harm, rather than the activity’s label. The agencies explain that the 2023 Guidance was often read too broadly, focused too heavily on whether an activity was critical rather than on the risk actually presented, and encouraged check-the-box processes that spread attention evenly instead of directing it to the highest-risk relationships. The proposal frames sound practice around four components: (1) identifying and assessing risk; (2) overseeing risk based on its significance; (3) making informed decisions about residual risk and risk acceptance; and (4) establishing appropriate governance practices.

The practical effects of the All-Bank Guidance may be meaningful for some banks. For example, a bank may elect to maintain a streamlined vendor inventory and exclude limited-risk relationships, such as clerical, professional, or office support services. Risk tiering should consider both the potential harm and the likelihood of that harm occurring, with relationships such as core processing likely treated as higher risk. Due diligence should scale with risk, allowing banks to use less extensive or publicly available information for lower-risk relationships. The proposal also states that no prescribed contractual terms are generally expected, even for higher-risk relationships, and that the presence or absence of a particular term in the provider contract alone would not support an adverse examination finding. Monitoring may be periodic or continuous based on risk. More broadly, the agencies recognize that banks are expected to manage, rather than eliminate, third-party risk.

What the Community Bank Guidance Adds

The Community Bank Guidance applies the principles set forth in the All-Bank Guidance to the operational realities of smaller institutions. It identifies four key areas of risk that will generally warrant the greatest attention: (1) operational resilience, which focuses on the impact a service provider disruption could have on the bank; (2) system and information security; (3) compliance with applicable laws and regulations, which focuses on how a third party impacts a bank’s ability to comply with applicable laws and regulations; and (4) financial resilience, which considers how a provider’s financial condition could affect the bank.

The guidance then examines eight categories of third-party providers commonly used by community banks: (1) core service providers; (2) information technology infrastructure providers; (3) cybersecurity providers; (4) payment processing and digital banking providers; (5) loan management system providers; (6) card issuing and processing providers; (7) Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money laundering financial crime platform providers; and (8) fraud prevention and detection providers. For each provider category, the guidance explains how the four key risk areas should be evaluated. In several instances, the guidance also addresses transition planning, including the process of converting from one core platform to another.

The Core Service Provider Joint Statement

The Joint Statement addresses a longstanding challenge for community banks. A small number of large firms dominate the core service provider market, reducing banks’ negotiating leverage and making it harder to conduct due diligence, negotiate appropriate contractual terms, and monitor performance. In deciding how closely to supervise a core provider directly, including whether to include it in a service provider examination program, the agencies will evaluate factors involving transparency, contract terms, and technology.

The Joint Statement highlights several practices that can increase concentration and exit risks for community banks, including unclear pricing and billing, lengthy periods for imposing retroactive charges, and excessive restrictions on integrations with other providers. It also raises concerns about unsupported or undefined deconversion fees, particularly when a bank must leave a platform because the provider breached the contract or delivered inadequate service.

Finally, the agencies indicate that certain core providers may qualify as institution-affiliated parties under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and could therefore face liability for a bank’s violations. Banks nevertheless remain ultimately responsible for operating in a safe and sound manner.

Looking Ahead

The proposals may change before they are finalized. The All-Bank Guidance and the Community Bank Guidance do not establish enforceable standards, and a failure to follow them will not, standing alone, result in supervisory action or criticism. The agencies may still act in response to violations of law or unsafe or unsound practices. Whether examiners will nevertheless apply the guidance as a de facto standard in examinations remains uncertain.

Comments on the All-Bank Guidance and Community Bank Guidance are due by November 16, 2026. The agencies may revise the proposals in response to stakeholder feedback before issuing final guidance. Banks should use the interim period to evaluate whether their third-party risk management programs support risk-based tailoring and proportionate oversight.

Krieg DeVault’s Financial Institutions attorneys will continue monitoring the proposed guidance and are able to provide counsel to financial institutions on the impact of the final guidance to their operations.


Disclaimer: The contents of this article should not be construed as legal advice or a legal opinion on any specific facts or circumstances. The contents are intended for general informational purposes only, and you are urged to consult with counsel concerning your situation and specific legal questions you may have.